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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the factors determining the capital structure of Spanish
small and medium-sized enterprises. This analysis is grounded on agency theory, pecking order theory,
and the signaling approach. The following elements were taken into consideration: i) the quantitative
variables of the enterprises, and ii) qualitative or  strategic variables, finally providing an analysis of the
explanatory power of the firms’ reputation, the ownership and control structure, and the relationship
between the SMEs and the finance company. A definition of the relationships which might be expected
between the proposed variables and the total borrowing ratio, according to the conceptual framework
under consideration was given as well. A survey of 410 Spanish SMEs was considered in the empirical
analysis. Firstly, we divided the survey into groups, according to the debt-equity ratio, and the
application of an ANOVA test, then we tested for significant differences in the variables for each group.
Next, we established a model of hierarchical regression for an overall comparison of the hypotheses that
the theoretical model provided. Among the most relevant results, we should highlight that the only
proposed hypotheses to be tested were those referring to the variables: ‘number of finance companies’
and ‘existence of real covenants unrelated to the business’. It may be said that dealing with a greater
number of companies and establishing a personal covenant increases the possibility of fund-raising on
the credit market, thereby avoiding a situation of credit rationing. However, there is no confirmation of
the explanatory power of the reputation or the ownership and control structure variables.
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2New approaches to the analysis of the capital structure of SMEs: empirical evidence from
Spanish Firms
I- Introduction
The decision on capital structure (CS), i.e., the decision related to the existence of an optimal total
borrowing ratio (TBR), is key to the whole issue of corporate finance.
Such a choice, like investment, financing and dividend policy decisions, should be evaluated in terms of
its impact on the firm's main goal, which is to maximize shareholders' wealth, or in other words,
maximize its market value for the shareholders. Thus, in efficient markets, market value becomes the
benchmark against which the firm's policies, strategies and decisions are assessed.
The different theoretical approaches to optimal capital structure focus both on the effects of debt policy
on the firm's financial objectives and the nature of the factors explaining its capital structure. Related
literature has evolved from the 'thesis of irrelevance' in the Modigliani and Miller model (M-M) (1958)
to the analysis of i) the tax shield provided by income taxes and its impact on corporations (Modigliani
and Miller, 1963; De Angelo and Mansulis, 1980), and ii) on individuals (Miller, 1977) as well as iii) the
financial distress derived from insolvency and bankruptcy risks (Brennan and Schwartz, 1978; Chem and
Kim, 1979; Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, 1984) to the most recent contributions, which take into account
information asymmetries and clash of interests between the agents involved. Within this last current of
thought, we can find 'agency theory' (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), stakeholder theory, pecking order
theory and the 'signaling approach'. In recent years, a new theory has been developed, studying the
effects that business strategies have on capital structure decisions – the Theory of Business Strategies.
Although these theoretical approaches deal with capital structure from different perspectives, what they
have in common is that they all study 'large' corporations (Michaelas, Chillenden and Poutziouris, 1999)
as opposed to small and medium-sized enterprises. Thus, they consider borrowing patterns, almost
exclusively, within the context of such 'large' companies. But the specific features that characterize small
and medium size enterprises make it difficult to apply most of the above-mentioned analytical tools. For
instance, one of the most important differences between large and small and medium-sized companies, is
the unavailability of long-term funding through capital markets for SMEs and therefore the absence of
market prices permitting objective assessment of their value (Osteryoung and Newman, 1993). Such
differences suggest the need to take a new look at capital structure drivers for SMEs. Besides, since
funding comes from different sources -credit markets for SMEs and capital markets for large companies-
3it would make more sense to conduct further research among different groups of SMEs rather than
between SMEs and large corporations.
The credit constraints faced by SMEs make credit markets their only available source of financing.
Lending relationships (LR) are critical mechanisms of assessment and control, even though credit
markets are certainly not efficient. The existence of information asymmetries and opposing interests
between lenders and borrowers, lead to 'credit rationing' (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988); Levenson and
Willard, 2000, inter alia). Therefore, the SMEs’ smaller size, lack of credit ratings or covenants, along
with concentration of ownership and control in the entrepreneur's hands, increase information
asymmetries, preventing SMEs from attaining better funding terms and conditions in the credit market
(Fazzari, Hubbard and  Petersen, 1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995).
When looking for key factors that may explain CS, in addition to considering figures relating to size -
number of employees, total assets, sales revenue-  there are certain qualitative variables, such as market
reputation, business experience, ownership structure and control, along with particular lending
relationships that are likely to become key issues ex ante for SME financing. The CS of the SME has
been discussed by Keasy and Watson (1987); Storey, Watson and Wynarczyk (1988); Ang (1991 and
1992); Reid (1993), Storey (1994); Robson, Gallagher and Daly (1994) and Jordan, Lowe and Taylor
(1998); inter alia. In Spain, Maroto (1996); Boedo and Calvo (1997) and Aybar, Casino and López
(2000); inter alia have published outstanding studies in this field.
This paper aims at contributing to the discussion on the CS of SMEs by considering not only the
quantitative variables already mentioned but also those of a qualitative or strategic nature. It is structured
starting with a brief summary of the different theoretical approaches analyzing the decision on CS
(following this first introductory section). Then, in the third section, we discuss the peculiarities of CS
decisions for SMEs, with further references to agency theory, pecking order theory and the signaling
approach. In the fourth section, we present the results of our empirical analysis, the variables and
hypotheses to be compared, along with the databases and methodologies applied. Finally, our
conclusions and further references on the topic are presented in the fifth section.
2- Capital Structure Theories
The decision on CS looks for an optimal mix of debt- and equity-financing to maximize the market value
of the firm. Modigliani and Miller (1958) proved that in so-called perfect financial markets -no taxes, no
bankruptcy costs, all agents with equal access to information- the decision on CS becomes irrelevant,
adding no value to shareholders, as the value of the firm relates solely to its assets' capacity to generate
4profits. However, empirical evidence from both financial markets and the corporate world differs from
M-M's 'perfect financial markets' proposition. Therefore, research has focused on the influence of taxes
and bankruptcy costs on the firm's financial structure, in order to develop reliable explanations for actual
borrowing policies. This led to the so-called 'compensation theory' of a trade-off between the positive
and negative effects of financial leverage. However, the theoretical models developed by this theory
failed to provide a completely satisfactory explanation to optimal CS either.
A number of other imperfections arising from information asymmetries and clash of interests among
agents -shareholders, managers and lenders- should be taken into account as well. Such defects may
modify investors' expected return and control and consequently impact on the firm's market value. The
'agency theory', the 'groups of interest theory', the 'pecking order theory' and the 'signaling' approach
shed light on a new dimension to the problem, developing innovative answers to the CS issue (Azofra
and Fernández, 1999).
The 'agency theory' was indeed a very significant step forward: a qualitative attempt to explain CS unlike
previous theoretical approaches. The contractual model of the enterprise proposed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) provided a new theoretical and conceptual framework which permitted the introduction
of other explanatory factors. Among the many contracts that define the nature of organizations, the
“agency theory” focuses on the financial contracts established between the organization and the
providers of liabilities, leading to two agency relationships: i) the “managerial relationship” established
between shareholders and managers, i.e., between the owners of the capital and the management board
of the enterprise; and ii) the “borrowing relationship” established between the lenders and the
shareholders. The information asymmetry and the clash of interests among the different agents involved
originate conflicts and agency costs. Thus, every financial structure is characterized by certain agency
costs, as a consequence of the possible loss that both shareholders and lenders might suffer, in the event
of possible opportunistic behaviors by managers or owners of the capital. These agency costs affect the
value of the securities. The optimal CS minimizes total agency costs (Boedo and Calvo, 1997). On the
other hand, “agency theory” analyses how borrowing can reduce the conflicts of agency emerging
between shareholders and managers (1), as well as those conflicts characterizing the relationship
between the shareholders and the fund petitioners in the financial borrowing contracts, which also
determine the shareholders’ willingness to grant funds, leading to situations of credit rationing (Harris
and Raviv, 1991) (2).
A more risk-adverse attitude towards the risk of the management board among the shareholders also
influences their preferences when designing the financial policy of the enterprise. According to the
“pecking order theory”—whose main conclusion is the enterprise’s organization of borrowing into a
5hierarchy, as explained by Myers (1984); Pettit and Singer (1985)—, the management board has a
greater preference for internal than for external funds, which are only accessed when there are real
opportunities for profitable investment, or when self-financing is insufficient. In that case, the
management board has a preference for borrowing, and only uses a share issue as a last resort —thus
avoiding having to share the management with newcomers to the activity—, since this transmits negative
information to the market (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). This hierarchic order within
enterprises is particularly relevant when they are small, due to the high costs derived from external
financing which they must account for (Pettit and Singer, 1985), and which, in opinion of Myers (1984),
is the main consequence of the information asymmetries existing in the credit market (Michaelas, et al.,
1999).
The “signaling approach” establish propositions about the sense and intensity of the market value
response of the shares in the event of an announcement of changes in the CS. The central idea in this
approach is that the market acts as a mechanism to supervise and control the managerial function,
assessing its financial decisions as an indication or an information signal about the future cash-flow and
solvency of the enterprise (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977).
3.- The decision on the capital structure within the context of the SME
The “large enterprise” has traditionally been the referential framework for corporate financing. This type
of enterprises is mainly characterized by: i) a clear separation and specialization of the functions of
ownership and control; ii) the dispersion of the ownership among a considerable number of shareholders;
iii) the use of the share and bond issue markets as a source of financing; and iv) the role that the capital
market plays as an assessment and control mechanism. Therefore, the existence of an objective
assessment and control mechanism by means of stock quotation becomes the referential point for the
analysis of the enterprise’s financial decisions, and particularly, for the study of its CS-related decisions.
Consequently, at this point we must ask to what degree the different theoretical frameworks that analyze
this type of decisions may be applied for the analysis of the capital structure of the SME.
The literature has traditionally stressed the importance of quantitative variables related to the volume of
assets, business turnover or number of workers, in the analysis of financial decisions. Without denying
the importance of those factors, recent works (Ang, 1991, 1992; Osteryoung and Newman, 1993)
underline the importance of other, qualitative variables related to how difficult it is to make use of share
issue markets and the structure of ownership and control.
The limitations found by the SMEs when accessing capital markets —share and bond issue markets—
6and the fact that its securities are not publicly negotiable in a secondary organized market, entail the non-
existence of an objective mechanism of assessment and control for this type of enterprises.
Consequently, it is not feasible to analyze the CS-related decisions taking as a point of reference their
effect on the financial objective, defined as the maximization of the enterprise’s market value. We
consider that the financial dependency of small enterprises on the bank credit market means we should
consider the lending relationship as the most adequate referential framework in order to analyze the CS.
Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) prove that the total borrowing ratio decreases with age and increases
with size. This is the same as stating that younger enterprises are more likely to turn to finance
companies with third-party resources, whereas adult companies are self-financed (Berger and Udell,
1992, 1995; Cardone, R. Longarela and Camino, 1998, inter alia).
The concentration of ownership and control by which the SMEs is usually characterized may also have
important consequences on the financing decisions. The lack of specialization of functions and the total
overlap between the roles of the entrepreneur and the owner entail the lack of delegation of authority,
and, therefore, the concentration of decision making in a single person, which encourages opportunistic
behaviors by the owner-manager, who in turn has a major part of his/her personal and family wealth
invested in the enterprise. This latter circumstance entails, moreover, the owner having de facto
unlimited responsibility. Where there is a lack of specialization, there is a clear identification of the
entrepreneur figure —owner-manager— with the enterprise in the SMEs, in such a way that the
development of the latter is closely bound to the entrepreneur's life.
All these circumstances increase the level of information asymmetry and class of interests that exist
between the different agents involved in the borrowing contracts, the agency approach and the
hypotheses based upon the theory of signals and pecking order are the basis for analysing CS-related
decisions in the case of SMEs.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Variables and relationships defining the model
Taking as a basis the rules established by agency theory, the pecking order theory and the signaling
approach, and bearing in mind the unique characteristic that the SME presents, we are grouping the
determining factors of the CS in two blocks: i) quantitative variables related to “size”; and ii) qualitative
variables(3) related to “reputation” of the enterprise, its “ownership and control structure”, and those
characterizing the “lending relationship".
a. Size. The size of the enterprise allows the lenders to calculate its market power and, therefore, to
7indirectly estimate its insolvency risk: The bigger the volume of assets, the profits, the sales or the
number of employees, the greater the self-financing capacity, and the probability that the activities are
correctly diversified and, consequently, the greater the solvency and the capacity to meet interest
payments. The size is in turn related to other group of variables that determine the CS of the enterprise.
Thus, larger enterprises present higher levels of investment, since they have a greater capacity to offer
more covenants to the lender. On the other hand, if we consider the economies of scale related to the
acquisition of new information, it is proportionally more expensive for lenders to supervise an SME than
a “large” enterprise. Furthermore, an SME finds it harder to meet the information requirements
established in the financial markets. Finally, it could be concluded that the size of the enterprise has
traditionally been one of the factors explaining the structure and concentration of ownership. The larger
the enterprise, the greater the separation between ownership and control, and the dispersion of the
capital. The possibility that the management board might display opportunistic behaviors against the
interests of the external shareholders explains the more frequent use of borrowing as an external
mechanism to supervise the managerial function. For all these reasons, according to agency theory and
the signals approach, we might expect a positive relationship between the size and the level of borrowing
in the enterprise.
H.1: Size—measured by the number of employees, volume of sales and volume of assets—
will be positively related to the total borrowing ratio.
b. Reputation of the enterprise. One of the factors that may reduce the agency costs of borrowing, and
especially those which originate from a situation of over-investment, is the variable that may be called
“reputation of the enterprise” (Diamond, 1989; John and Natchman, 1985; Wijst, 1989). Diamond (1989)
suggests that the “reputation of the enterprise” may be measured as a function of variables such as age
and/or length of service. The reputation is reflected as  greater ease in obtaining the required financing.
The capital market’s observation of the SME fulfilling its contractual obligations over a long period is
one of the enterprise’s most valuable intangible assets. The credit market accumulates this information,
the variable reputation is related to the capacity of the enterprise to tackle its payment commitments
originating in borrowing—repayment of the principal and interests (Cardone, et al., 1998)(4). The
managers’ willingness to preserve this intangible asset discourages opportunistic decision-taking; high-
risk investments are rejected in favor of more secure projects, thereby diminishing the agency costs of
the borrowing derived from decisions on over-investment. Consequently, according to agency theory and
the signals approach, it may be expected that the longer the service, the greater the reputation in the
credit market, and, therefore, the greater the facilities to obtain the necessary financing.
The “reputation” may also be measured as a function of the number of years that the enterprise has been
8owned by the entrepreneur. The scarce grade of specialization that generally exists in this type of
enterprise with respect to the functions of ownership and control, together with many owner-
manageress’s reluctance to delegate responsibilities, creates a great dependency of the SME on the figure
of the owner-manager. When this person withdraws from the post—due to decease, illness, retirement,
change of activity, etc.— problems of succession may arise within the enterprise, causing the credibility
and reputation acquired to be lost, and sometimes leading to the disappearance of the enterprise.
Consequently, change of ownership is similar to creating and setting up a new enterprise, increasing the
information asymmetry and the risk that the lender perceives (Boedo and Calvo, 1997). Therefore, a
positive relationship may be expected between the number of years that the enterprise has belonged to its
current owner and the level of borrowing.
H.2: Reputation measured by the enterprise’s years of service and the years that it
belongs to its current owner will be positively related to the total borrowing ratio.
c. Ownership Structure. The relationship between the SME and the lenders is, in turn, characterized by
the ownership and control structure in the enterprise. It is possible to distinguish two major types of
SMEs, i) those in which the manager is the owner of the entire capital, and ii) the medium-sized family
enterprises in which there is usually some extent of separation of functions. It is possible to identify two
important interest groups: a) the owner-managers; and b) the external owners that do not sit on the
management board (Ang, 1991, 1992).
If the capital and the control are in the hands of a few agents only, the clash of interests between
managers and shareholders is diminished, and it is not necessary to use borrowing as a mechanism of
supervision and control over the managerial function. There is also a reduction in the information
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, and possible opportunistic behaviors by owners-managers
could be avoided. In consequence, according to agency theory, a positive relationship is expected
between the degree of specialization and separation of the functions of ownership and control, and the
total borrowing ratio.
Nevertheless, the pecking order theory points out that SMEs in which there is no separation of functions
and in which the owner-manager has invested a major part of his/her personal wealth, so there is no self-
financing, tend to show a preference for the use of borrowing, in order to avoid involving outsiders and
the loss of control in the decision-taking.
9H.3a: The specialization and the separation of the ownership and control functions are
positively related to the total borrowing ratio (agency theory and signals approach).
H.3b: The specialization and the separation of the ownership and control functions are
negatively related to the total borrowing ratio (pecking order theory).
e. Characteristics of the lending relationship. The possibilities of raising funds in the credit market may
also be determined by the features characterizing the relationship between the lender and the borrower.
Three explanatory variables have been considered in this respect: i) the “age of the relationship with the
main finance company”; ii) “the number of finance companies”, and iii) the existence of covenants, as
well as their nature.
The experience of a past relationship completes the information that the lender has about the borrower
and, at the same time, cuts study costs. Conversely, in the case of new applicants for funds, the lenders
have only the information provided by the SME itself or the information that may be obtained from
external sources, namely, from other lenders or from rating agencies. For all these reasons, the
information asymmetry depends on the age of the lending relationship, in such a way that those
enterprises maintaining a long-standing relationship are expected to grant credit more readily, since they
are not the object of its rationing. The theory suggests that the enterprises with a closer association to the
finance companies usually have fewer capital costs and greater availability of funds. Consequently,
according to the rules of agency theory and the signals approach, a positive relationship is expected
between the duration of the lending relationship and the level of borrowing.
H.4.a.: The length of service of the lending relationship is directly related to the total
borrowing ratio.
The availability of credit may also be determined by the number of finance companies with which the
borrower maintains a relationship. The bigger the number of entities with which the borrower deals, the
greater the ease of access to credit, since the information relative to the relationship flows more freely,
diminishing the levels of asymmetry that exist in the market.
H.4.b.: The number of financial companies with which the SME deals, is directly related to
the total borrowing ratio.
The covenants that the manager-owner decides to provide and their nature may be an information signal
about the future earnings that the entrepreneur-owner expects from his/her investment (Stiglitz, 1987).
10
The cost of losing these assets in the event of bankruptcy is the enticement that asserts the validity of that
signal and that transmits positive information to the lenders about the borrowing capacity of the
enterprise. From the point of view of the borrowing decision, the benefits for the entrepreneur willing to
provide more covenants—of a personal nature, mainly, or related to certain assets that do not belong to
the enterprise—, is materialized in a less probable credit rationing. The signal is greater when the
covenants are personal or real, related to assets that do not belong to the business activity. In
consequence, according to the agency theory and the signal approach, a positive relation is expected
between the existence of those covenants and the total borrowing ratio.
H.4.c.: The existence of covenants in the borrowing contracts by the SME, is directly
related to the total borrowing ratio.
As stated above, the objective of this study is to make an exploratory analysis on the nature of the factors
determining the CS in the case of SMEs. The total borrowing ratio has been considered as a dependent
variable representative of the CS, defined as the quotient relation between third-party resources—
lenders—and the total debt—a variable that is identify as TBR—. The explanatory variables in turn have
been grouped in four blocks.
• Block 1: related to the size; three variables have been considered: i) SIZE1 related to the number of
employees; ii) SIZE2 related to the volume of sales; and iii) SIZE3 related to the total number of net
assets.
 
• Block 2: comprises the variables of reputation of the enterprise. Two variables have been considered:
i) AGE1 related to the age or length of enterprise service; and ii) AGE2 related to the number of
years that the enterprise has belonged to its current owner.
 
• Block 3: Related to the ownership and control structure, we considered the variable DIR, a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the enterprise is managed by a non-owner.
 
• Block 4: comprises the variables defining the lending relationship. Five variables were included in
this group: i) NFC related to the number of financial companies with which the enterprise maintains
a relationship; ii) AR which measures the age of the relationship with the main finance company,
and iii) PERC, REALCUNR, and REALCR which measure, respectively, whether the enterprise
provides covenants of a personal or real nature, related or unrelated to the activity of the enterprise.
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Figure 1. Variables and proposed relationships
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Additionally, the model includes the sector of the main activity of the SMEs as a control variable. The
variables named after the abbreviations INDSEC, COMSEC, CONSEC and SERSEC, serve to identify
whether the enterprise belongs to industry, commerce, construction or services, respectively.
4.2. Data and methodology
In order to compare the relationships outlined in the model, an empirical analysis has been made on a
sample of 13,200 SMEs belonging to the “Spanish Guide of Exporting Enterprises”. The fieldwork has
been done by an e-mail questionnaire sent out between November 1999 and January 2000. The number
of valid questionnaires obtained sum a total of 410 enterprises, which represents 3.1% of the enterprises
surveyed.
In order to clarify the relationships which are established between the independent variables and the
TBR, the survey has been divided into four groups in function of the values that the ratio may have.
Group I comprises those enterprises with lower degree of borrowing, which present a TBR lower than or
equal to 25%. Group 2 includes enterprises with a TBR ranging between 25 and 50%. Group 3 consists
of enterprises with a TBR ranging between 50 and 75%. And, finally, Group 4 represents those
enterprises with a higher degree of borrowing, namely, with a TBR above 75%.
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Next, the existence of significant differences between the groups is analyzed, considering each of the
independent variables by means of an ANOVA analysis. The average values of the independent
variables used in the analysis of the different groups are shown in table 1. Significant differences may be
observed with respect to the following variables: i) number of employees; ii) volume of net total assets;
iii) number of financial companies with which the enterprise maintains a relationship; iv) age of the
relationship with the main financial company; and v) the existence of real covenants unrelated to the
business.
Finally, in order to contrast the hypotheses established in the theoretical part, and to analyze the
combined effect of the explanatory variables on the TBR, a model of hierarchical regression has been
developed, consisting in the successive introduction of the groups of variables corresponding to the four
blocks considered into the regression equation, namely, enterprise size, reputation, ownership and
control structure, and characteristics of the lending relationship.
4.3. Results
Beginning with the “size” of the enterprise, it may be observed that the enterprises in the survey have an
average staff of 35 employees; an average volume of sales of 710 millions pesetas (4,27 millions €); and
average net assets of 347 millions pesetas (2,09 millions €). It may be noted that the enterprises with
least borrowing —group 1, with borrowing lower than 25%—are generally smaller enterprises, in terms
of number of employees and business turnover. In turn, the larger enterprises present a TBR ranging
between 25 and 50%. Although the differences are statistically significant for the variable number of
employees and volume of assets, the analysis of the data does not seem to confirm the relationships that
might be expected in theory, that is, H.1. is not fulfilled: the larger the size, the higher the total
borrowing ratio (TBR) ratio. In this sense, the results are not contradictory with the ones obtained in
other empirical works (Peterson and Schulman, 1987; Holmes and Kent, 1991). It may be considered
that larger enterprises present higher capitalization rates and, consequently, lower levels of borrowing.
With respect to the “main activity sector”, it may be observed that 39% belong to the service sector, 29%
belong to the industry sector, and 22% belong to the commerce sector. Although there are no significant
differences between groups, except in the case of the construction sector, it may be noted that the
enterprises with higher borrowing belong to industry, whereas those with lower borrowing belong to the
services sector.
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With respect to the “reputation of the enterprise”, measured by means of the variable length of service—
AGE1—, it may be observed that the enterprises in the survey have an average age of 20 years. It may be
equally noted that the enterprises belonging to Group 1—with lower borrowing—, as well as the
enterprises included in Group 4—with higher borrowing—, are the youngest ones, with an average age
of 18 and 17 years, respectively. It must be underlined that it is the enterprises belonging to Group 2,
with a TBR ranging between 25 and 50%, which are the most long-standing and experienced. In
consequence, even though the differences are statistically significant between groups for variable AGE1,
the analysis of the data does not seem to confirm the relationship established at a theoretical level in the
model proposed, that is, there is no fulfillment of H.2., which states that the greater the reputation—
measured in two ways by the age of the enterprise and the years it has belonged to the current owner—,
the higher the total borrowing ratio. As far as variable AGE2 is concerned—years in possession of
current owner—the results are similar.
With respect to the “ownership and control structure” in the survey, it may be observed that only 11.48%
of the enterprises are managed by non-owners. As might be expected in an SME collective, there is
generally no clear separation of functions, the ownership and control being in the owner’s hands.
However, there is no sign of significant differences between the groups considered. Data analysis does
not seem to confirm the relationships established at a theoretical level by agency theory and the signals
approach—H.3a is not fulfilled—, although there seems to be a confirmation of the sense of the
relationship, according to the pecking order theory—H.3.b—.
Finally, we will focus on the main characteristics that define the lending relationship. Beginning with the
“number of financial companies”, it may be observed that the enterprises in the survey are associated, on
average, to at least 4 financial companies. Moreover, some statistically significant differences between
the groups under study may be noticed. Enterprises with lower degree of borrowing—Group 1—deal
with 3 companies as an average, whereas those with higher degree of borrowing—Group 4—deal with
5. In consequence, it may be observed that the enterprises with higher borrowing are the ones dealing, on
average, with a higher number of companies. This confirms the sense of H.4b in the relationship between
this variable and the TBR.
Concerning the “age of the relationship with the main financial company”, the age of the relationship for
the group under survey is only 3.77 years. If we compare this data with the average age of the
enterprises, 20.47 years, it could be noted that the relationships are usually rather recent. This may
indicate great competitiveness in the current credit market, so that many entrepreneurs frequently change
company. In a similar way, some statistically significant differences are noticed between groups, the age
of the relationship is generally younger for those enterprises with lower degree of borrowing. This
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confirms H4.a.—-.
Table 1: ANOVA
VARIABLES Global Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Signif.
LSIZE1
(Ln Number of employees)
Measured
No. cases
34.85
392
19.57
74
53.08
58
36.32
114
34.21
146
.025
LSIZE2
(Ln Volume of sales)
Measured
No. cases
709.73
379
592.44
71
1117.3
58
671.95
112
629.44
138
LSIZE3
(Ln Volume of net total assets)
Measured
No. cases
346.89
274
545.29
44
911.29
46
479.22
84
346.89
100
.035
INDSEC
(Industry activity sector)
Measured
No. cases
.2916
391
.2267
75
.3621
58
.2857
112
.3014
146
COMSEC
(Commerce sector)
Measured
No. cases
.2174
391
.1733
75
.2414
58
.2411
112
.2123
146
CONSEC
(Construction sector)
Measured
No. cases
.00844
391
.00533
75
.0017
58
.1161
112
.1027
146
0.093
SERSEC
(Services sector)
Measured
No. cases
.3862
391
.5333
75
.3793
58
.3125
112
.3699
146
AGE1
(Years since the commercial activity began)
Measured
No. cases
20.47
393
18.50
76
27.28
58
21.86
114
17.69
145
.018
AGE2
(Years in possession of the current owner)
Measured
No. cases
16.59
388
15.43
77
18.72
57
19.21
110
14.38
144
DIR
(Managed by a non-owner)
Measured
No. cases
.1148
392
.1169
77
.1379
58
.1316
114
.0090
143
NFC
(Number of finance companies)
Measured
No. cases
4.18
395
3.32
75
3.93
58
4.50
115
4.47
147
.033
AR
(Age of the relationship with the main finance Co.)
Measured
No. cases
3.77
347
3.20
49
4.20
51
4.04
113
3.59
134
.000
PERC
(PERSONAL covenants)
Measured
No. cases
.20
273
.14
44
.19
32
.19
85
.23
112
REALCUNR
(REAL covenants unrelated to the business
activity)
Measured
No. cases
.20
271
.12
42
.0093
32
.27
85
.21
112
0.083
REALCR
(REAL covenants related to the business activity)
Measured
No. cases
.18
271
.11
44
.0096
31
.19
84
.22
112
We could conclude the descriptive analysis by referring to the importance of covenants, as well as to
their nature, though it must be remarked that the number of responses and the quantity of the cases
surveyed in relation to these variables is considerably lower —273 cases. 20% of the cases have
covenants of a personal or real type unrelated to the business, and 18% have real covenants related to the
activity. Within groups, it is observed that the percentages are higher in those enterprises that present
higher total borrowing ratios—which confirms H4c—, even though it is only for the case of the real
covenants unrelated to the business that the differences between groups are statistically significant.
Finally, a model of hierarchical regression has been proposed for across-the-board comparison of the
hypotheses. Before that, the array of the correlations between the variables has been calculated, and a
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very high correlation observed among the variables SIZE1, SIZE2 and SIZE3. For this reason, the
variable corresponding to the Napier’s logarithm of the volume of net total assets has been introduced as
an explanatory variable of the size in the regression model—table 2—.
In the first step, the variable LSIZE3 and those variables of control related to sectors of main activity
were included; it could be observed that only the volume of assets is statistically significant. Thus, the
relationship is confirmed: the greater the volume of assets, the higher the TBR.
In the second step, the variables related to reputation of the enterprise, namely, AGE1 and AGE2, were
added to the previous variables. In this case, the variable size related to the volume of assets remains
statistically significant, which does not confirm the hypothesis related to the variable reputation, nor even
the sense of the relationship for the variable AGE1.
In the third step, the variable DIR, a variable related to the ownership and control structure was added to
the previous variables. In this case, it may be observed that the volume of assets is the one statistically
significant. With respect to the variable DIR, it may be remarked that the sense of the relationship is the
one observed according to the pecking order theory, even though it is not statistically significant.
In the fourth step, two variables related to the characteristics of the lending relationship were added to
the previous variables, namely, NFC—number of financial companies—and AR—age of the
relationship—. In this case, it is observed how the variable related to the size becomes statistically
insignificant, whereas the “number of financial companies” is indeed significant. In the array of
correlations, it may be remarked that both variables are correlated in such a way that enterprises with
larger size usually deal with greater number of financial companies, which favors their access to the
credit market. In this sense, the hypothesis established in the theoretical model may be confirmed.
Concerning variable AR, the sense of the relationship is the opposite. In consequence, the “age of the
relationship with the main financial company” is not an explanatory factor of the CS. This circumstance
is due to the features of the credit market, which is very competitive, and the change of company
becomes, thus, a normal practice among the enterprises.
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Table 2: Hierarchical regression model
VARIABLES Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
(Constant) 41.441 46.788 44.432 27.692 35.662
LSIZE3
(Volume of net total assets)
12.486** 13.495** 14.018** -.576 -3.046
INDSEC
(Industry activity sector)
-39.441 -40.997 -38.782 -38.379 -45.166
COMSEC
(Commerce sector)
-30.644 -32.402 -31.198 -32.385 -32.527
CONSEC
(Construction sector)
-17.224 -20,597 -21.367 -12.070 -11.336
SERSEC
(Services sector)
4.456 .562 2.926 29.200 30.504
AGE1
(Years since the main activity began)
-.664 -.573 -.128 -.412
AGE2
(Years in possession of the current owner)
.371 .296 -.438 -.294
DIR
(Managed by a non-owner)
-31.106 -32.674 -21.925
NFC
(Number of finance companies)
24.519*** 24.119***
AR
(Age of the relationship with the main
finance Co.)
-7.130 -9.241
PERC
(PERSONAL covenants)
69.242*
REALCUNR
(REAL covenants unrelated to the business
activity)
33.325
REALCR
(REAL covenants related to the business
activity)
-24.400
Dependent variable: total debt (TBR)
* Significant at 5% (the lowest)
** Significant at 2% (lower)
*** Significant at 1%(higher)
Finally, in the fifth step, the variables related to the covenants are added to the previous ones. In the
model of total regression where all the factors are included, it may be observed that the statistically
significant variables explanatory of the RET are the following ones: the number of finance companies—
NFC—and the existence of personal covenants—PERC—. Both factors are positively related to the
TBR, which confirms the hypotheses established in the theoretical model.
5. Summary and concluding remarks
The main objectives of this work are: give an exploratory analysis about the nature of the factors
determining the CS of the SME. The distinctive features that this type of enterprises present are centered
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on three major characteristics: i) the impossibility of using the issue markets, and, therefore, the absence
of an objective mechanism of assessment, ii) the dependency of this type of enterprises on the bank
credit market; and iii) the presence of a ownership and control structure that is characterized by the non-
separation of both functions.
All these circumstances entail two important consequences. On the one hand, they increase the degree of
information asymmetry that exists among the different agents involved in the market, the agency theory,
the pecking order theory and the signals approach are the optimal conceptual referential framework to
study the decisions related to the CS in the case of the SME. On the other hand, they require a
reconsideration of the analysis, the relationship LR in the credit market is the ideal referential framework
or unity of analysis.
In the specific case of the SME and besides the importance of quantitative variables related to the size,
and other qualitative variables related to the reputation, the ownership and control structure, and the
characteristics of the lending relationship, seem, a priori, relevant factors to be taken into account in the
analysis of this type of decisions.
• Concerning the size, even though the differences are statistically significant for the number of
employees and volume of assets, the analysis of the data does not seem to confirm the relationships
that might be expected in theory, namely, the larger the size, the higher the total borrowing ratio.
 
• Related to the age of the enterprises AGE1, even though the differences are statistically significant
between groups for this variable, the analysis of the data does not seem to confirm the relationship
established at a theoretical level in the proposed model. With respect to the variable AGE2—years in
possession of the current owner—the results are similar—that is, H.2. would not be fulfilled—.
 
• With respect to the variable ownership and control structure, it may be observed that those
enterprises with  higher specialization of the functions are the ones with lower degree of borrowing.
Then, it may be confirmed that the sense of the relationship is negative, in the same way as the
pecking order theory suggests, even though it is not statistically significant in the regression model.
 
• Finally, with respect to the characteristics of the “lending relationship”, the number of financial
companies and the existence of real covenants unrelated to the business are the relevant variables. It
may be remarked that are the enterprises with higher degree of borrowing the ones usually dealing
with higher number of companies, which confirms H.4.b. about the relationship between this
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variable and the TBR. In a similar way, it may be observed that, in 20% of the cases, the enterprises
have covenants of a personal or real type not related to the business, and 18% have real covenants
related to the activity. Notice that between groups, the percentages are higher for those enterprises
that present higher total borrowing ratios—which confirms H.4.c.—, even though it is only the
differences between groups for the case of the real covenants not related to the business that are
statistically significant.
All in all, the empirical analysis only confirms the hypotheses related to the total RET for the variables:
“number of finance companies” —NFC— and “existence of real covenants not related to the business”
—REALCUR. This confirms the hypotheses H.4.b. and H.4.c. In this sense, it may be stated that dealing
with a greater number of companies, and establishing personal covenants, increase the possibilities of
fund-raising on the credit market, avoiding situations of credit rationing. On the other hand, the empirical
analysis does not permit such confirmation of the explanatory power of other variables related to size—
H.1.—, reputation—H.2.—, or the ownership and control structure—H.3.—. This is due to the
characteristics that currently define the credit market, which is very competitive and where all financial
companies constantly strive to gain new clients.
The results of the study are in line with the latest research, which is still in its initial phases, due to the
number of its research studies and to the rather inconclusive results generally obtained.
In spite of the difficulties in studying financial decisions within the specific field of SMEs, we believe
that it would be useful in the future: i) to continue studying in more detail the demand factors, that is, the
internal variables of the enterprise that determine this type of decisions; and ii) to incorporate into these
studies the analysis of the supply factors, which are related to the characteristics of the financial markets.
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Notes
1.- We can highlight, inter alia, the works of: Easterbrook (1984) related to the decision on borrowing as a
mechanism to facilitate the supervision of the financial markets; and Jensen (1986) related to the decision on
borrowing as a mechanism to reduce the funds of free availability.
2.- An extension of the financial agency theory is the so-called “theory of groups of interest”. Following a similar
reasoning to the one in the previous model, this new theoretical approach takes into account other groups of interest
in the enterprise which may be affected by the enterprise financial decisions, namely: workers, clients, and
providers (Titman, 1984; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Willianson, 1988; Fama, 1990).
3.- Scholtens (1999) studied the mechanisms of control that diminish the information asymmetry in order to
confront efficient projects, distinguishes between: ownership, collateral and covenants, relationships and reputation
(page 138).
4.- The SMEs enter the credit market with low-quality insufficient information, which increases the information
asymmetries that already exist, although in Norton’s opinion (1991), these information differences depend on the
“stage or life cycle” that the enterprise is going through. During the growing stage of the SME, the financial
markets have little or no information about it. It is for this reason that self-financing and very short-term borrowing
prevail as a source of fund-raising. During its development stage, the SMEs steadily consolidate their position in
both markets and the success or the failure of their projects, as well as the fulfillment of their financial
compromises, permit the development of relationships with the financial companies that may facilitate their access
to the credit market with more favorable conditions, establishing capital structures based on long-term borrowing.
Once in their maturity stage, the SMEs have access to the capital market and is in that moment that the bond is
issued, the development of projects by means of financial mediators (e.g. Loan Guarantee Association or Capital
Venture Enterprises), and the increment in capital is more important as sources of finance.
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